Abstract-We establish formal bounds for the number of min-entropy bits that can be extracted in a timing attack against a cryptosystem that is protected by blinding, the state-of-the art countermeasure against timing attacks. Compared with existing bounds, our bounds are both tighter and of greater operational significance, in that they directly address the key's one-guess vulnerability. Moreover, we show that any semantically secure public-key cryptosystem remains semantically secure in the presence of timing attacks, if the implementation is protected by blinding and bucketing. This result shows that, by considering (and justifying) more optimistic models of leakage than recent proposals for leakage-resilient cryptosystems, one can achieve provable resistance against side-channel attacks for standard cryptographic primitives.
I. INTRODUCTION
Side-channel attacks against cryptographic algorithms recover keys from information that is revealed by the algorithm's physical execution; they pose a serious threat to the security of today's cryptosystems. Timing attacks [15] are especially significant, because they can be carried out remotely (e.g. over networks [6] ), which opens the door to a potentially large number of attackers.
Previous countermeasures against timing attacks were either not fully practical or not backed up by formal security guarantees. In [17] , a countermeasure-input blinding and bucketing-has been proposed that at the same time is practical and offers formal security guarantees. However, the security guarantees in [17] are given in terms of a bound on the number of Shannonbits of the secret key that are leaked. They are not fully satisfactory for two reasons.
First, bounds based on Shannon-entropy yield operational guarantees for the expected effort for recovering secrets by brute-force search. However, examples show that even if the expected effort is large, the probability of guessing the secret with a small number of guesses can be unacceptably high [25] .
Second, the bounds from [17] only capture the information that is contained in the side-channel observations. They do not take into consideration adversaries that can leverage additional information, e.g. public keys and chosen plaintext-cipertext pairs. It is unclear whether the combination of a small amount of secret key leakage together with such additional information could be used to break the system, as was shown for the symmetric-key case in [14] . Public-key cryptosystems that can deal with partial leakage of the secret key are emerging [2] , [21] , but they rely on sophisticated constructions and are of unclear practicality.
In this paper, we address both of these open problems: First, we show that the countermeasure from [17] delivers bounds on the min-entropy leakage of the secret key, which yields strong operational guarantees about the vulnerability of the key to being found in a small number of guesses. Moreover, our new bounds also improve on the bounds from [17] in terms of tightness.
Second, we show that any cryptosystem that is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (i.e. that satisfies IND-CCA2) is also secure against combined timing-and adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, given that the implementation is protected using the countermeasure from [17] . This implies that side-channel resistance can be achieved using a standard cryptosystem implemented with the countermeasure, rather than requiring special leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives. We achieve this result by using a more optimistic leakage model than the ones considered in recent work on leakage-resilient cryptography [2] , [10] , [20] , [21] , and showing that this model is justified by the countermeasure.
The technical development of the informationtheoretic part of our work is based on modeling an nobservation blinded timing attack using a channel matrix C ta n , whose [s, (o 1 , . . . , o n )] entry gives the conditional probability of observing a sequence of execution times (o 1 , . . . , o n ), given that the secret key is s. The number of rows and the number of columns of C ta n are both very large. But we show that C ta n can be factored into the product of two channel matrices T n U n so that the inner dimension (the number of columns of T n and the number of rows of U n ) is small. We then show that the number of leaked min-entropy bits is bounded from above by the logarithm of this inner dimension, which leads to our bounds on the vulnerability of the secret key.
For the cryptographic part of our work, we first extend IND-CCA2 to a notion of security that assumes adversaries that have access to a channel C that captures individual execution times of an implementation with blinding and bucketing applied. We show that a polynomial number of outputs of this channel can be equivalently replaced by a single output of a channel T with polynomially bounded range. We further show that any efficient adversary A that breaks the security of the cryptosystem using T can be turned into an efficient adversary A that violates vanilla IND-CCA2: A first samples A's advantage for distinguishing ciphertexts, for all possible outputs of T , and then runs A on the output with the largest estimated advantage, thereby violating IND-CCA2. Finally, we outline some connections between the information-theoretic and the cryptographic aspects of our work.
In summary, our contribution is twofold. First, we provide bounds for the information that is leaked by the timing behavior of a blinded implementation. These bounds improve over existing bounds by providing stronger operational security guarantees. Second, we show that standard cryptographic security guarantees remain valid in the presence of timing leaks that are mitigated by blinding and bucketing. This result, by shifting the burden of proof from the cryptographic primitive to its implementation, opens a new perspective for obtaining practical and leakage-resilient cryptosystems.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II we recall the basics of min-entropy leakage, timing attacks, blinded cryptography, and bucketing. In Section III, we present new results on min-entropy channel capacity and use them to bound the min-entropy leakage of the n-observation timing attack on blinded cryptography. In Section IV, we present our cryptographic reduction, which shows that a semanticallysecure cryptosystem remains semantically secure when adversaries are given access to timing information, provided that it is protected by blinding and bucketing. In Section V, we discuss our results and suggest some future directions. Finally, Sections VI and VII discuss related work and conclude.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Channels and min-entropy
In this section, we briefly recall the motivation and definitions of the min-entropy measure of information leakage proposed in [25] .
A channel is a triple (S, O, C), where S is a finite set of secret input values, O is a finite set of observable output values, and C is an |S| × |O| matrix, called the channel matrix, such that C[s, o] = P [o|s], the conditional probability of obtaining output o given that the input is s. Note that each row of C sums to 1. We will informally refer to channel (S, O, C) simply as C.
Any a priori distribution P S on S determines a random variable S. Moreover, P S and C determine a joint probability P ∧ on S ×O, where
We quantify the amount of information that flows from S to O by considering an adversary A who wishes to guess the value of S. It is natural to measure information leakage by comparing A's "uncertainty" about S before and after seeing the value of O, using the equation leakage = initial uncertainty -remaining uncertainty.
We define "uncertainty" by considering the vulnerability of S to being guessed correctly in one try by A; if we make the worst-case assumption that A knows P S and C, then the a priori vulnerability is
and the a posteriori vulnerability is
We convert from vulnerability to uncertainty by taking the negative logarithm, giving Rényi's min-entropy [24] . Our definitions, then, are
• remaining uncertainty: H ∞ (S|O) = − log V (S|O) (Note however that there is no universally agreedupon definition of conditional min-entropy H ∞ (S|O) in the literature [7] .) Finally, we define the min-entropy
Thus min-entropy leakage is the logarithm of the factor by which knowledge of O increases the one-guess vulnerability of S. We remark that if A is allowed to make multiple guesses, then focusing on one-guess vulnerability might seem inadequate. But, in many cases, useful bounds can be obtained simply by observing that allowing i guesses at most increases the vulnerability by a factor of i. Thus if we write V i for i-guess vulnerability, we have
Most of the literature on quantitative information flow (for example, [8] and [18] ) has defined "uncertainty" using Shannon entropy (rather than min-entropy), so that leakage from S to O is defined as mutual information:
Measuring leakage using Shannon entropy gives different operational guarantees than those given by minentropy. Massey's guessing entropy bound [19] shows that conditional Shannon entropy H(S|O) gives strong bounds on the expected number of guesses required to find S by brute-force search, given O. However, examples in [25] show that this expected number of guesses can be arbitrarily high even when S is highly vulnerable to being guessed in one try. In contrast, conditional min-entropy H ∞ (S|O) satisfies
so it provides strong operational guarantees about the vulnerability of S, given O.
B. Timing attacks and input blinding
In this section, we briefly review the model of timing attacks against blinded cryptography from [17] and show how it can be cast as a channel according to our definition.
We consider implementations of cryptographic algorithms for which the execution time can be captured by a function f : S × M → O such that f (s, m) gives the time required to decrypt message m using secret key s. Here S is the finite set of secret keys, M is the finite set of messages, and O is the set of possible timings (e.g. the range of clock ticks between the worst-case and the best-case execution times). We assume that the adversary has full knowledge of the implementation; in particular we assume that f is known to the adversary. This deterministic timing model captures specialpurpose implementations in synchronous hardware, as well as software implementations on simple microprocessors without state, e.g. without caches and pipelines. For implementations on microprocessors with caches and pipelines (but without interferences such as interrupts and preemptions), the execution time is not necessarily a function of the implementation's inputs. However, if one forces the processor into a fixed initial state before each execution, the execution time becomes deterministic and modeling the implementation as a function is valid.
In a timing attack against f , the adversary gathers n side-channel observations o 1 = f (s, m 1 ), . . . , o n = f (s, m n ) for deducing s or narrowing down its possible values. All known timing attacks against RSA decryption require that the adversary be able to obtain a large number of pairs (m i , o i ) of ciphertexts and corresponding execution times. Input blinding tries to defend against timing attacks by randomizing each ciphertext m i before decryption; it decorrelates the ciphertexts from the execution times and thus renders all known timing attacks ineffective. Example 1. Consider an RSA decryption x = m s mod N , where m is a ciphertext chosen by the adversary, x is the plaintext, N = p · q is the modulus, and s with s · e = 1 mod ϕ(N ) is the secret key. In the blinding phase, one picks a random r that is relatively prime to N and computes m · r e mod N . The result of the decryption is (m · r e ) s = x · r mod N , which yields x after unblinding, i.e., after multiplication with r −1 mod N .
Input blinding techniques are available for many common cryptographic algorithms, including ElGamal and Diffie-Hellman; the mathematical details of these techniques depend on the algebraic properties of the individual cryptosystems.
Looking at Example 1, observe that if the values of the masks r are independent and uniformly distributed, then the blinded inputs to the RSA decryption are also independent and uniformly distributed. We therefore model blinding in general by assuming that when the adversary observes n blinded timings, f (s, m 1 ), . . . , f (s, m n ), then the messages m i being decrypted are chosen randomly and independently, according to some probability distribution P M . It follows that the information leaked in an nobservation blinded timing attack can be captured by a
gives the conditional probability of observing the timings (o 1 , . . . , o n ) given that the secret key is s.
C. Bucketing
Finally, we describe bucketing. Intuitively, a larger set O of possible timing observations will result in a larger amount of information leakage in a timing attack. This intuition has been formalized in [17] , and has led to the proposal of combining blinding with another countermeasure, bucketing. Bucketing is the discretization of a system's execution times such that the results of the computation are returned at only a small number of fixed points in time. Bucketing reduces the size of O, but at some cost to the system's performance, since results must be delayed to the next bucket time.
However, experiments with a 1024-bit RSA implementation [17] show that the performance overhead introduced by bucketing is very small compared to that introduced by a constant-time implementation: for a bucketing of size 5, the performance overhead with respect to an implementation without bucketing is less than 0.7%; for a bucketing of only 2 buckets, this overhead is still less than 3%. In contrast, a bucketing of size 1 (i.e. a constant-time implementation) leads to a performance overhead of more than 36%. (Note that this comparison ignores the overhead introduced by the blinding and unblinding steps. If the involved factors can be precomputed, however, this overhead will be small.) In the following we will typically assume that O is a set of small size.
III. INFORMATION-THEORETIC BOUNDS
In this section, we will develop techniques that allow us to derive bounds on the maximum min-entropy leakage of the n-observation timing channel C ta n .
A. Min-entropy channel capacity
We begin by developing the theory of min-entropy channel capacity for an arbitrary channel (S, O, C). The channel capacity is the maximum leakage of the channel over all possible a priori distributions on S. Definition 1. The min-entropy channel capacity of (S, O, C), denoted ML(C), is the supremum, over all a priori distributions on S, of the min-entropy leakage from S to O:
(Recall from Section II that the random variable S is implicitly associated with the a priori distribution P S .)
It turns out to be quite simple to calculate the minentropy channel capacity, as it is just the logarithm of the sum of the column maximums of C: Theorem 1. The min-entropy channel capacity of C is
and it is realized by a uniform distribution on S.
Proof: Using the formulas in Section II we have
The upper bound is realized iff the following condition holds: for all o ∈ O, there exists s * ∈ S such that
. This condition holds when S is uniformly distributed. It can hold for nonuniform distributions as well, provided that some proper subset of the rows of C includes at least one maximum from each column.
Note that Theorem 1 appears already in [5] (though without the observation about nonuniform distributions).
Theorem 1 shows that min-entropy leakage is maximized by a uniform a priori distribution P S . We remark that min-entropy leakage is strongly dependent on the a priori distribution. As a trivial example, if the a priori vulnerability of S is 1, then there is nothing to leak, so the leakage is 0 regardless of C. More interestingly, consider the following (n + 1) × n channel matrix C 0 :
Assume an a priori distribution in which s 0 has probability 1 2 and s 1 through s n each have probability
as well, since on output o i we know that the input was either s 0 or s i , each with probability 1 2 . It follows that the minentropy leakage under this a priori distribution is 0, since C 0 does not then improve the adversary's oneguess probability of guessing S. (Interestingly, if we consider two-guess vulnerability V 2 , then we see that V 2 (S) = n+1 2n but V 2 (S|O) = 1.) If, instead, we consider min-entropy channel capacity, then we see that the n column maximums are all 1, giving a capacity of log n, showing that C 0 can indeed leak a great deal.
If we focus on min-entropy channel capacity, then we can easily see that a capacity of 0 implies that there is no leakage at all, because the channel satisfies probabilistic noninterference, which means that the output is completely independent of the input: Corollary 1. The min-entropy channel capacity of C is 0 iff the rows of C are identical.
Proof: By Theorem 1, the channel capacity of C is 0 iff the sum of its column maximums is 1. But each row of C sums to 1, so after considering the first row of C the sum of the column maximums is already 1. If any subsequent row differs at all from the earlier rows, it increases the sum of the column maximums above 1, which means that the capacity is positive. Conversely, if the rows of C are identical, then the sum of the column maximums is 1, which means that the capacity is 0. Now we turn to the main result of this section, which concerns the factorization of channel matrices. Recall that matrices C 1 and C 2 can be multiplied provided that the number of columns of C 1 is the same as the number of rows of C 2 -we refer to this common number as the inner dimension. We have the following theorem, which shows that a factorization of a channel matrix implies a bound on its min-entropy channel capacity: Theorem 2. If channel matrix C = C 1 C 2 , where C 1 and C 2 are channel matrices with inner dimension p, then the min-entropy channel capacity of C is at most log p.
Proof:
The key observation is that the [s, o] entry of C is a convex combination of the elements of column o of C 2 ; the coefficients are given by row s of C 1 . Letting set T index the inner dimension, we have
which implies that the sum of the column maximums of C is at most the sum of the column maximums of C 2 . But the sum of the column maximums of C 2 is at most p, since C 2 has p rows, each of which sums to 1. Hence, by Theorem 1, the min-entropy channel capacity of C is at most log p.
As a corollary, we can get easy upper bounds based on the number of rows or columns of C:
Corollary 2. The min-entropy channel capacity of C is at most the logarithm of the number of rows of C, and at most the logarithm of the number of columns of C.
Proof: If C has q rows and r columns, then we can trivially use both q and r as the inner dimension in a factorization of C using an identity matrix of appropriate dimension: C = I q×q C and C = CI r×r .
Theorem 2 has an intuitive interpretation. We can view a channel matrix C as a pipe, where the number of rows of C is the size of the input end of the pipe, and the number of columns of C is the size of the output end of the pipe. In the case where C = C 1 C 2 , where the inner dimension p is small, we can view the pipe as being narrow in the middle, which prevents it from leaking very much.
B. Min-entropy channel capacity of the n-observation timing attack on blinded cryptography
We now return our attention to the n-observation timing attack on blinded cryptography considered in [17] . Recall from Section II that this attack can be seen as a channel from S to O n that is described by a channel matrix C ta n , whose [s, (o 1 , . . . , o n )] entry gives the conditional probability of observing the timings (o 1 , . . . , o n ), given that the secret key is s. What is the value of this entry? Under our assumptions, the conditional probability of observing the timing o i at position i can be calculated by collecting all messages m such that f (s, m) = o i , and summing their probabilities, which are given by distribution P M . The product of those probabilities over all i gives the probability of observing the timings (o 1 , . . . , o n ). Thus we have
(1) Having determined the channel matrix C ta n , we now wish to determine upper bounds on its min-entropy channel capacity. Our bounds are based on a simple observation about the structure of C (o 1 , . . . , o n ) of C ta n are identical. We now argue that this structural property of C ta n allows us to factor it with a small inner dimension.
We first recall the information-theoretic method of types; see for example [9] . The type tō of a sequencē o = (o 1 , . . . , o n ) is the sequence of counts of the number of occurrences of each element of O within o. We let T n = {tō |ō ∈ O n } be the set of types of sequences in O n . Also, we let |tō| denote the number of sequencesō ∈ O n such that tō = tō. Using types, we can rephrase our structural property of C
Now we can present our factorization:
Lemma 2. Channel matrix C ta n can be factored into the product of two channel matrices with inner dimension |T n |.
Proof: Let matrix T n , indexed by S and T n , be defined by
.) Let matrix U n , indexed by T n and O n , be defined by
(Note that both T n and U n are channel matrices, since each of their rows sums to 1.) It is easy to see that C ta n = T n U n . We have
(The second equality above follows from the fact that U n [tō,ō ] = 0 whenever tō = tō .) Thus we have shown that channel (S, O n , C ta n ) is the composition of channels (S, T n , T n ) and (T n , O n , U n ). Together, these results now allow us to bound the amount of min-entropy leakage of the n-observation timing attack on blinded cryptography: Theorem 3. The min-entropy channel capacity of the channel matrix C ta n is at most log |T n |.
Proof: Follows immediately from Theorem 2 and Lemma 2.
We emphasize that Theorem 1 of [17] establishes the same upper bound, log |T n |, as we do. But there the bound is on the Shannon channel capacity, rather than the min-entropy channel capacity, of C ta n . This makes a big difference in the operational security guarantees that are provided. Specifically, Massey's lower bound on guessing entropy [19] shows that the upper bound on Shannon channel capacity in [17] implies a strong lower bound on the expected number of guesses required to guess the secret key S after the C ta n attack. But such a bound does not rule out the possibility that the adversary could, nevertheless, have a large probability of guessing S in a small number of tries. In contrast, our bounds on min-entropy channel capacity do allow us to rule out such a threat. We will illustrate this concretely, once we have analyzed |T n |.
As shown in Lemma 1 of [17] , it is easy to see that
since each of the |O| possible timing values must occur between 0 and n times in any sequence (o 1 , . . . , o n ). This gives an immediate corollary:
Corollary 3. The min-entropy channel capacity of C ta n is at most |O| log(n + 1).
We can tighten this upper bound somewhat by calculating |T n | more carefully:
Proof: Counting the size of T n can be viewed as an "Occupancy Problem" as discussed in Section II.5 of Feller [11] . We want to know in how many ways we can place n indistinguishable "balls" (the timing observations) into |O| "bins" (the possibilities for each observation). In general, the number of ways of putting n indistinguishable balls into b bins turns out to be the binomial coefficient
To see this, note that each such placement can be represented as a string of n stars (representing the balls) with b − 1 bars inserted (representing the boundaries between the bins). For example, with n = 5 and b = 4, the string * * | * || * * represents the case when we put 2 balls in the first bin, 1 ball in the second bin, 0 balls in the third bin, and 2 balls in the fourth bin. If the symbols were all distinguishable, then the number of such strings would be (n + b − 1)!. But since the n stars and b−1 bars are indistinguishable, then the total number of strings is
which is equal to the above binomial coefficient. Using Lemma 3, we get the following tighter bound:
Corollary 4. The min-entropy channel capacity of C ta n is at most log n + |O| − 1 n .
We now are ready to discuss the operational security guarantees provided by Theorem 3 and Lemma 3. The crucial fact is that min-entropy channel capacity is an upper bound on min-entropy leakage, which in turn is the logarithm of the factor by which one-guess vulnerability is increased by the attack. Let us consider a concrete scenario. Suppose that the secret key S has a priori vulnerability of 2 −500 , and that an adversary does an n-observation blinded timing attack with n = 2 40 and |O| = 5 (thanks to bucketing).
Using the bound in Corollary 4, we see that the minentropy leakage is at most This means that the expected a posteriori vulnerability of S is at most 2 −500 · 2 155.4 = 2 −344.6 . Hence the adversary's expected probability of guessing the key in one try is at most 2 −344.6 , and of guessing the key in 2 20 tries is at most 2 −344.6 · 2 20 = 2 −324.6 . In contrast, the cruder bound in Corollary 3 (used by [17] ) here gives a leakage of 5 log(2 40 + 1) ≈ 200. So Lemma 3 considerably improves the leakage bound, from 200 to 155.4 bits. (Of course the more important difference from [17] is that our leakage bound is for min-entropy leakage, rather than Shannon entropy leakage.)
In conclusion, blinding and bucketing give strong guarantees about the vulnerability of the secret key S to timing attacks. In the next section, we broaden our perspective by considering an adversary that combines a timing attack with an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack.
IV. CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY IN THE PRESENCE
OF SIDE-CHANNELS In this section, we show that any public-key cryptosystem that is secure against adaptive chosenciphertext attacks (e.g. RSA-OAEP [12] ) is also secure against adversaries that can additionally measure the execution time of the decryption algorithm, provided that the cryptosystem's implementation is protected by blinding and bucketing.
To prove this result, we first extend the notion of security against adaptive chosen-ciphertext adversaries (IND-CCA2) [23] to a notion of security that incorporates adversaries that additionally have access to a channel that leaks information about the secret key. We assume that the range of the channel is bounded and that the outputs of the channel are independent. As discussed in Section II, such a channel captures the timing behavior of an implementation with blinding and bucketing applied. We then show that a polynomial number of independent outputs of this channel can be equivalently replaced by a single output of a channel with polynomially bounded range. Finally, we prove that this polynomially bounded channel can be entirely eliminated, showing that the side-channel information does not constitute a significant advantage for the adversary.
A. A notion of security for blinded cryptography
We begin by recalling and extending basic definitions about public-key cryptography.
Definition 2.
A public key encryption scheme Π is a triple Π = (G, E, D) , where G is the key generation algorithm, E the encryption algorithm and D the decryption algorithm.
Indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) [23] is a strong notion of semantic security for public-key cryptosystems. It captures that no realistic adversary can distinguish between the encryptions of two self-chosen messages with nonnegligible probability, even if it has access to a decryption oracle. We model such an adversary as two probabilistic polynomial time algorithms A 1 and A 2 , where A 1 outputs the challenge messages msg 0 and msg 1 , together with a string state, which is used for communication between A 1 and A 2 . A 2 is given a challenge ciphertext c, which is the encryption of either msg 0 or msg 1 , and it outputs a guess of which it was. We define two decryption oracles. The first oracle D sk decrypts every ciphertext it is queried on. The second oracle D sk behaves as D sk , except that it returns a default value for every attempt to decrypt the challenge ciphertext c.
Definition 3 (IND-CCA2).
A public-key encryption scheme Π = (G, E, D) is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ), it holds that
is the event that the following game outputs true.
We extend IND-CCA2 by additionally giving the adversary access to the output of a channel that reveals information about the secret key sk . In Section II, a channel (S, O, C) represents a conditional probability distribution of observations for given secret keys, which is defined in terms of the channel matrix C. In this section, we generalize channels to accommodate for the derivation of asymptotic security guarantees. More precisely, we consider families of channels (S(k), O(k), C(k)), where k is the security parameter. Whenever convenient (e.g. to emphasize that a channel serves as an oracle of arity 0 for the adversary) we denote a channel as a family of random variables
We assume that, for a given secret key sk , the adversary can access independent repetitions of O sk (k). For a public-key cryptosystem, the distribution of secret keys is given by the key generation algorithm G. As is standard, we often leave the security parameter k implicit. The following definition formally captures our novel notion of security.
Definition 4 (IND-CCA2-C).
A public-key encryption scheme Π = (G, E, D) is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks in the presence of the channel C = {O sk } if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ), it holds that
(c, state) 6) Output b = b Finally, we say that a public key cryptosystem satisfies IND-CCA2-C1 if it satisfies IND-CCA2-C when A is given only a single access to O sk .
Note that IND-CCA2-C and IND-CCA2-C1 both specialize to IND-CCA2 if the output of the channel is independent of the input, i.e. if the channel satisfies probabilistic noninterference.
B. Channels of bounded range
In this section we introduce channels with bounded range. Channels with bounded range model the timing behavior of blinded implementations with bucketing applied. The following definition captures that the maximal number of possible observations b is fixed for all security parameters k, while the set of possible observations may vary for each k. Note that, from a theoretical point of view, it would be desirable to parameterize b by k to allow the number of buckets to grow with the security parameter. However, as discussed in Section II-C, bucketings of very small size compared to the key length already lead to highly efficient implementations. Thus, modeling the timing behavior of blinded implementations with bucketing as channels with bounded range is reasonable, even for our asymptotic considerations.
For a channel C = {O sk } with bounded range b and a polynomial p, we define the channel T C p = {T sk } as follows. For a fixed k, the output of T sk (k) is obtained by taking the outcomes of p(k) independent repetitions o = o 1 , . . . , o p(k) of O sk (k), and sorting them with respect to a fixed order on O(k). This ordered sequence is a canonical representative of the type of the sequence o. The range of the variables T sk (k) is independent of sk , and we denote it by T p(k) (k).
Observe that the channel T C p(k) (k) corresponds to the factor T p(k) (k) of the factorization of the channel C ta p(k) (k) defined in Lemma 2. According to Equation 2 of Section III, |T p(k) (k)| is upper-bounded by the polynomial expression (p(k) + 1)
b . Moreover, note that the set T p(k) (k) can be efficiently enumerated. Proof: Let A be an adversary that violates IND-CCA2-C given C = {O sk }, and whose running time is bounded by the polynomial p. Then there is also an adversary A that violates IND-CCA2-C1 given T C p = {T sk }. The adversary A performs a single call to T sk , saves the result to a dedicated tape, and applies a random permutation to the tape content. A then runs A, where each call of A to O sk is replaced by reading a new symbol from the dedicated tape. Since the running time (and hence the number of calls to O sk ) of A is bounded by p, the tape contains sufficient observations. As all sequences of observations of the same type are equally probable, the content of the additional tape is indistinguishable from independent calls to O sk . A hence produces output that is indistinguishable from that of A and violates IND-CCA2-C.
Observe that the application of a random permutation to the output of T C p corresponds to the application of the factor U p of the channel C ta p defined in Lemma 2 of Section III. We will shed further light on this connection in Section V.
C. Replacing channels by sampling
We now show that a single access to the channel T For the proof of Lemma 5, we assume an adversary A that violates IND-CCA2-C1 in the presence of T C p = {T sk } for some polynomial p, and we show that this gives an adversary A that violates IND-CCA2. How can A do without the oracle T sk ? The idea is that A can enumerate all of the (polynomially-many) possible oracle values t ∈ T p and can estimate A's advantage given t by repeatedly running A for each such t. More precisely, for each t, A runs steps 2) through 6) of the Ex CCA2C A game m times, answering A's decryption queries using D sk and answering A's oracle query using t. Note that A itself randomly selects the challenge bit and performs the encryption of the corresponding message in steps 3) and 4) of the game. For each t, A computes the relative frequency with which A wins, and chooses t * to be the value that gives the largest estimated advantage. A then completes its own Ex CCA2 A game by simulating A with oracle result t * . Notice that A's advantage with t * might be substantially smaller than with a correct value from T sk . But, by the Chernoff inequality, the probability that A picks a "bad" t * decreases exponentially quickly in m, the number of samples made. By choosing m appropriately, then, we can show that A runs in polynomial time and achieves non-negligible advantage, violating IND-CCA2.
Before we present the formal proof of Lemma 5, we give some auxiliary definitions and lemmas. To this end, assume a fixed keypair (sk , pk ) and an IND-CCA2-C1 adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ). For t ∈ T p , we define G(t) as the event that the following game outputs true.
We write G T in cases where G obtains its argument from a random variable T . Note that G T sk corresponds to the event Ex CCA2C A with the fixed keypair (sk , pk ) and the restriction that the adversary may access the channel T sk only once.
We further define the random variableT m that captures the sampling process as previously described bŷ
where F m [G(t)] denotes the relative frequency with which the event G(t) occurs in m independent repetitions. For a fixed > 0, we define the event S by
The event S captures that, for all t ∈ T p , the sampling process was sufficiently precise. The following lemma states that the probability of imprecise sampling (i.e., that of ¬S) decreases exponentially with the number m of samples made.
with X i ∈ {0, 1} and P [X i = 1] = p, the Chernoff inequality (see e.g. [27] ) states that
Instantiating X i by G(t) in (3), we obtain
for each t ∈ T p . Thus the probability of ¬S is bounded from above by e −2 2 m |T p |.
We further show that if S andT m = t * hold, the adversary's advantage when given t * will not be significantly lower than the adversary's advantage when given the output of the oracle T sk .
Lemma 7. For all t * ∈ T p we have
Proof: By definition, the event S entails the following events
for all t * , t ∈ T p . Intuitively, (4) says that the actual probability of winning with t * is not much worse than the observed relative frequency; (5) says that the observed relative frequency of winning with t is not much worse than the actual probability. We further have thatT m = t * implies
Combining (4), (5), and (6) we conclude that S ∧T m = t * entails
The lemma then follows by taking the convex combination over P [T sk = t], for all t ∈ T p , on the right hand side of (7). We are now ready to give the formal justification of Lemma 5.
Proof of Lemma 5: Recall that, for a fixed keypair (sk , pk ), the event G T sk corresponds to Ex CCA2C A where A can make a single access to T sk , and observe that G T m corresponds to Ex CCA2 A
. We obtain the following connection between the probabilities of both events.
For (*), observe that Lemma 7 implies
To see this, note that, for a fixed t * , the statement on the right hand side of the implication of Lemma 7 is true whenever there is an elementary event for which the left hand side is true. P [T m = t * ∧ S] > 0 ensures that such an event exists.
Using Lemma 6 to bound P [¬S], we further obtain
Up to this point we have assumed a fixed keypair (sk , pk ). We now take the expected value over all keypairs generated by G(1 k ) and make the security parameter k explicit in our notation. We obtain
2 | is non-negligible by assumption, i.e. there is a polynomial q such that
for infinitely many k. Instantiating with 1 4q(k) and m with 16q(k) 2 k, we obtain
which is non-negligible and concludes this proof.
D. Cryptographic security in the presence of channels
We are now ready to give the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 4. Any public-key cryptosystem that is IND-CCA2 secure is also IND-CCA2-C secure in the presence of a channel with bounded range.
The proof of Theorem 4 follows directly from Lemmas 4 and 5. Furthermore, observe that our proofs are valid without modification for weaker notions of security, such as IND-CCA and IND-CPA. We omit a formalization of the corresponding definitions and statements for better readability.
We conclude this section with the following corollary of Theorem 4 applied to the channel C ta 1 (see Example 2 in this section), which states that the security of a cryptosystem is preserved under timing attacks, provided that the cryptosystem's implementation is protected by blinding and bucketing.
Corollary 5. Any public-key cryptosystem that is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks is also secure against combined timing-and adaptive chosenciphertext attacks, given that the implementation is protected by input blinding and bucketing.
Note that the statement of Corollary 5 relies on assumptions about the implementation of the cryptosystem, as discussed in Section II-B.
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our presentations of the information-theoretic bounds in Section III and the cryptographic guarantees in Section IV are largely independent. However, there are close connections between the two parts. As pointed out in Section IV, the factorization of the channel matrix C ta = T U presented in Lemma 2 corresponds to the two core parts of the reduction proof presented in Section IV. The outputs of the matrix T correspond to the outputs of the channel T C from Section IV, which are representatives of the types of sequences of observations. Furthermore, the channel U implicitly appears as part of the adversary A defined in the proof of Lemma 4: A receives the output of T C as an input and applies a random permutation, thereby obtaining the output of U . This illustrates that it could be possible to generalize the results in Section IV to arbitrary factorizations C = C 1 C 2 of channel matrices. However, such a generalization would require us to introduce additional assumptions about the efficient enumerability of the inner dimension of the factorization and the efficient computability of the distribution associated with C 2 , together with a parameterization in the security parameter. We have avoided these technicalities by choosing a more direct way of presenting our results. Ignoring these additional assumptions for a moment, the connections between Sections III and IV can be oversimplified as follows:
Small leakage
Sec. III
⇐= Factorization
Sec. IV
=⇒
Cryptographic security
As future work, we plan to investigate whether the arrow on the left-hand side can be inverted, i.e. whether a given bound on the amount of leaked information implies factorizations of the channel matrix with bounded inner dimension. Such a result could enable us to more directly derive cryptographic security guarantees from the outcomes of a quantitative information-flow analysis.
From a practical perspective, it would be interesting to derive concrete security guarantees for implementations that are protected by blinding and bucketing. Such guarantees would allow one to reason about the required keylength for achieving security in practice, which is beyond the scope of the asymptotic guarantees derived in this paper.
VI. RELATED WORK
Our results are based on the model of side-channels from [16] and the model of unknown-message attacks from [3] . The proposal for combining bucketing and blinding, together with bounds on the number of Shannon bits that are leaked is due to [17] . We extend these bounds by giving corresponding bounds for the minentropy/vulnerability leakage, which have been shown to deliver stronger operational security guarantees [25] .
With respect to the theory of min-entropy channel capacity, Braun et al. [5] consider "multiplicative leakage" V (S|O)/V (S) (which is essentially the same as our min-entropy leakage) and "additive leakage" V (S|O)−V (S). They show that channel capacity under multiplicative leakage is realized by a uniform a priori distribution, but under additive leakage it is realized by some "corner point" distribution that gives probability 1 k to k of the elements of S and probability 0 to the rest.
Several approaches in language-based security use type systems to detect [13] , eliminate [1] , [4] , or mitigate [22] timing leaks. Applying these languagebased approaches to cryptographic algorithms requires restrictive programming and precise knowledge about the time consumption of the individual instructions on the underlying machine. The combination of bucketing and blinding weakens these requirements at the price of partial information leakage. In this paper, we show that this leakage is so small that it does not compromise the security of standard cryptographic primitives.
Standaert et al. propose a framework for the evaluation of side-channel attacks [26] , where they use two different metrics for the evaluation of systems: an information-theoretic metric and a security metric. The information-theoretic metric captures the amount of information (in Shannon entropy) that a non-adaptive chosen-message adversary can obtain from a sidechannel and is not given a direct interpretation in terms of security. The security metric characterizes the security of a system in terms of the success rate of applying a given key recovery strategy to the measurement data. In this way, an analysis with the model of [26] yields assertions about the effectiveness of a particular kind of attack, but not necessarily universal bounds.
Naor and Segev [21] present a generic construction for leakage-resilient public-key cryptosystems from universal hash functions. They show that their construction leads to a variant of the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem that is CCA2-secure in the presence of leakage of up to 1/6 (adversarially chosen) bits of the secret key. In our model, only the number of side-channel observations can be chosen by the adversary, and the amount of leaked information corresponds to a number of bits that is logarithmic in the number of measurements. With this more optimistic model of leakage, which is justified by the use of blinding as a countermeasure, we show that any CCA2-secure cryptosystem is leakage-resilient.
Alwen et al. [2] propose leakage-resilient public-key cryptosystems for a model of leakage that allows the adversary to learn a large (potentially gigabytes) but bounded amount of information about the secret key. Clearly, this model of leakage requires the use of secret keys that are even larger than the amount of leaked information. The challenge with this model of leakage is to devise cryptosystems that operate efficiently on such large keys.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We established formal bounds for the number of minentropy bits that can be extracted in a timing attack against a cryptosystem that is protected by blinding and bucketing. Compared with the bounds derived in [17] , our bounds are both tighter and of greater operational significance, in that they directly address the probability of guessing the key in one attempt. Moreover, we have shown that any CCA2-secure public-key cryptosystem remains CCA2-secure in the presence of timing attacks, if the implementation is protected by blinding and bucketing. This suggests that, by combining security guarantees for cryptographic primitives with guarantees for their implementation, one can achieve cryptosystems that are leakage-resilient and practical at the same time.
